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Abstract
Several important security issues of Deep Neural Network (DNN) have been
raised recently associated with different applications and components. The most
widely investigated security concern of DNN is from its malicious input, a.k.a ad-
versarial example. Nevertheless, the security challenge of DNN’s parameters is
not well explored yet. In this work, we are the first to propose a novel DNN weight
attack methodology called Bit-Flip Attack (BFA) which can crush a neural net-
work through maliciously flipping extremely small amount of bits within its weight
storage memory system (i.e., DRAM). The bit-flip operations could be conducted
through well-known Row-Hammer attack, while our main contribution is to de-
velop an algorithm to identify the most vulnerable bits of DNN weight parameters
(stored in memory as binary bits), that could maximize the accuracy degradation
with a minimum number of bit-flips. Our proposed BFA utilizes a Progressive Bit
Search (PBS) method which combines gradient ranking and progressive search to
identify the most vulnerable bit to be flipped. With the aid of PBS, we can suc-
cessfully attack a ResNet-18 fully malfunction (i.e., top-1 accuracy degrade from
69.8% to 0.1%) only through 13 bit-flips out of 93 million bits, while randomly
flipping 100 bits merely degrades the accuracy by less than 1%.
1 Introduction
Recently, deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated its great potential of sur-
passing or close to human-level performance in multiple domains, such as object recog-
nition [1], Game AI [2], synthetic voice [3], neighborhood voting prediction [4] and etc
[5]. It stimulates the demand for deploying the state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms
in real-world applications to release labors from repetitive work. Under such circum-
stance, the security and robustness of deep neural network is an essential concern which
cannot be circumvented.
Adversarial example [6] (aka., adversarial attack) is a well-known security issue of
DNN, which can cause the system malfunction with the magnitude-constrained input
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noise that mankind cannot discern. Both attack and defense of adversarial example on
the input end of DNN has been heavily investigated in the past couple of years [7, 6, 8]
and still be in progress [9, 10, 11]. Nevertheless, the security issue of network param-
eters themselves is not yet well explored. Recently, the development of fault injection
attack [12] has raised further security concerns on the storage of DNN parameters.
The possible reasons that there was a lack of concerns on the security of network
parameters may come in twofold: 1) The neural network is widely recognized as a
robust system against parameter variations. 2) The DNNs are used to be only deployed
on the high-performance computing system (e.g., CPUs, GPUs, and other accelerators
[13, 14]), which normally contains a variety of methods ensuring data integrity. Thus,
attacking the parameters is more related to a system cyber-security topic. However, the
game has been totally changed during the past few years. First, the robustness of neural
network to small perturbation has been put into the spotlight by adversarial examples
on DNN input [6, 7]. Second, with the aid of DNN compression techniques (e.g.,
pruning[15] and quantization [16]) and outstanding compact neural network architec-
tures [17, 18], deep neural networks now are friendly to the resource-limited mobile
device as well. Such resource-limited platforms normally lack effective data integrity
check mechanism, which makes the deployed DNN vulnerable to popular fault injec-
tion techniques, such as row hammer and laser beam [19].
Recently, there exist a cohort of works [12, 20] in an attempt to attack DNN network
parameters stored in DRAM using Row Hammer Attack (RHA). However, the key
limitation to these previous attack methods is that they primarily focused on extremely
vulnerable full-precision DNN model (i.e., parameters in floating-point format). Our
conducted simulation shows that randomly flipping the exponent part of floating-point
weight could easily overwhelm the functionality of DNN. The explanation behind that
is flipping the bits in exponent part of floating-point value can increase the weight to
extremely large value, thus leading to the exploded output. As a result, attacking the
weight constrained DNN (i.e., weights quantized into fixed-point values) is the primary
focus in this work, where the range of weight magnitude relies on the bit-width of
weights.
Overview of Bit-Flip attack: In this work, we attempt to perform parameter attack
on the weights of quantized DNN, whose weight magnitude is intrinsically constrained
owing to the fixed-point representation. In order to conduct an efficient bit-flip attack
on weights, for the first time, we propose a Bit-Flip Attack (BFA) together with Pro-
gressive Bit Search (PBS) technique, that can totally crush a fully functional quantized
DNN and convert it to a random output generator with several bit-flips. Our proposed
PBS combines gradient ranking and progressive search to locate the most vulnerable
bits, while BFA performs the bit-flip operations on the located bits along their gradient
ascending directions. In order to identify the vulnerable bits to be flipped within the
identical layer and across different layers, we perform the in-layer search and cross-
layer search in an iterative way. Thus, for each BFA iteration, only the most vulnerable
bit elected by the PBS technique will be flip to its opposite binary value. The extensive
experiments are conducted regarding various network structure, different datasets and
quantization bit-width, and etc. It is shocking to notice that ResNet-18 will become
2
a random output generator (i.e., 0.1% top-1 accuracy) with only 13 bit-flips out of 93
million bits by our proposed attacking method, on ImageNet dataset.
2 Related Work
Memory Bit-Flip in Real-World: Flipping a memory cell bit within memory system
is a realistic and demonstrated threat model in existing computer systems. Recently,
Kim et al., [21] have demonstrated a method to cause memory bit-flip in DRAM merely
through the frequent data accessing, which is now popularly known as Row-Hammer
Attack (RHA). A malicious user can use RHA to modify the data stored in DRAM
memory cell by just flipping one bit at a time. [22] showed that by creating a profile
for the bit flips in a DRAM, row hammer attack can effectively flip a single bit at any
address in the software stack. According to the state-of-the-art investigations, common
error detection and correction techniques, such as Error-Correcting Code (ECC) [23]
and Intel SGX [24], are broken defense mechanism to RHA. Such existing memory
bit-flip attack (i.e. row-hammer attack) model brings a huge challenge to the security
of DNN powered computing system since its parameters are normally stored in the
main memory, i.e. DRAM, for maximizing the computation throughput, which is di-
rectly exposed to the adversarial attacker. Moreover, such challenge becomes more se-
vere considering the fact that DNN powered applications are widely deployed in many
resource-limited (e.g. smart IoT devices, mobile system, edge devices, etc.) system
that lacks necessary data integrity check mechanism.
Previous Neural Network Parameter Attack. Adversarial example attack has been
widely explored [25] to evaluate the robustness of DNN. However, we are still at the
rudimentary stage towards investigating the effect of network parameter attack on neu-
ral network accuracy. Neural network parameters have been attacked using different
levels of hardware trojans, which require a specific pattern of input to trigger the trojan
inside the network [26]. Moreover, such trojan attack requires hardware level modi-
fications, which may not be feasible in many practical applications. As a result, fault
injection attacks could become a suitable alternative to attack DNN parameters [12].
For example, single Bias attack (SBA) attacks a certain bias term of a neuron to change
the classification of DNN to a different class [12]. Other works have injected faults
into the activation function of the neural network to miss classify a target input [20].
Limitations of previous works. However, these previous attack algorithms are de-
veloped based on a full-precision model (i.e. network parameters are floating-point
numbers stored in memory in the format of IEEE standard for floating-point arithmetic
[27]), where we believe such attack algorithms may not be efficient. Since it is ex-
tremely easy to cause DNN malfunction by just flipping the most significant exponent
bits of any random floating-point weight parameters. Through this simple method, it
mainly causes DNN malfunction by exponentially increasing the magnitude of particu-
lar weight parameters by just several bit-flips. We conducted such experiment to prove
its efficiency in section 4.4. Based on our simulation results, it shows just 1 bit-flip
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of the most significant exponent bit of a random floating-point number weight could
cause ResNet-18 network totally malfunction on ImageNet dataset.
Why we need a bit search algorithm. On the other side, most of recent deep neu-
ral network applications are performed in quantized platform such as google’s Tensor
Processing Unit (TPU) [28], that uses 8-bit operations for quantized network. Such
fixed precision models are more robust to network parameter perturbation. Similarly,
we conducted another experiment to randomly choose quantized weight for bit-flip at-
tack using RHA. The simulation results in figure 4 show that 100 bit-flip in a quantized
ResNet-18 could only cause 0.6% accuracy degradation in ImageNet, which clearly
indicates that random selection of quantized weight parameters to be attacked is not
efficient and feasible. Thus, an efficient algorithm is required to search for the most
vulnerable weights/bits in a quantized DNN.
3 Approach
In this section, we present a novel Bit-Flip Attack (BFA) method to maliciously cause
a DNN system malfunction through flipping extremely small amount of vulnerable bits
of weights. Our proposed algorithm, called Progressive Bit Search (PBS), is to identify
those vulnerable DNN weight parameters (stored in terms of memory bits in DRAM)
that could maximize the accuracy degradation with minimum number of bit-flips. It
is worth to note that this work focuses on BFA on a more robust DNN with quantized
weight parameters instead of floating-point number weights as discussed earlier.
3.1 Problem Definition
Given a quantized DNN contains L convolutional/fully-connected layers, the original
weights in floating-point are symmetrically quantized into 2Nq − 1 levels with Nq-bits
uniform quantizer. The quantized weights W are arithmetically represented in Nq-bits
signed integer. In the computing memory system, W is stored in the format of twos
complement1, which is denoted as B in this work. More details of weights quantization
are described in Section 3.2. The goal of this work is to find the optimal combination
of vulnerable weight bits to perform BFA, thus maximizing the inference loss of DNN
parameterized by the perturbed weights whose twos complement representation is Bˆ.
Such vulnerable bit searching problem can be formulated as an optimization problem
as:
max
{Bˆl}
L
(
f
(
x; {Bˆl}Ll=1
)
, t
)
− L
(
f
(
x; {Bl}Ll=1
)
, t
)
s.t.
L∑
l=1
D(Bˆl,Bl) ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nb}
(1)
1All the binary weight mentioned hereinafter referred to as the weights in twos complement.
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where x and t are the vectorized input and target output2. Taken x as the input, the in-
ference computation of network parameterized by {Bˆl}Ll=1 is expressed as f(x; {Bˆl}Ll=1).
Note that L(·, ·) calculates the loss between DNN output and target. D(Bˆl,Bl) com-
putes the Hamming distance between clean- and perturbed-binary weight tensor, and
Nb is maximum Hamming distance allowed through the entire DNN.
3.2 Quantization and Encoding
Weight quantization. In this work, we adopt a layer-wise Nq-bits uniform quantizer
for weight quantization. For l-th layer, the quantization process from the floating-point
base Wfpl to its fixed-point (signed integer) counterpart Wl can be described as:
∆wl = max(Wfpl )/(2
Nq−1 − 1); Wfpl ∈ Rd (2)
Wl = round(Wfpl /∆wl) ·∆wl (3)
where d is the dimension of weight tensor, ∆wl is the step size of weight quantizer. For
training the quantized DNN with non-differential stair-case function (in Eq. (3)), we
use the straight-through estimator [29] as other works [16]. Note that, since ∆wl ∈ R
is the coefficient shared by all the weights in l-th layer, we only store its fixed-point
part (Wl/∆wl) ∈ {−2Nq−1, ..., 2Nq−1}d, rather than Wl.
Weight Encoding. The computing system normally stores the signed integer in two’s
complement representation, owing to its efficiency in arithmetic operations (e.g., mul).
Given one weight element w ∈ Wl, the conversion from its binary representation
(b = [bNq−1, ..., b0] ∈ {0, 1}Nq ) in two’s complement can be expressed as:
w/∆w = g(b) = −2Nq−1 · bNq−1 +
Nq−2∑
i=0
2i · bi (4)
With the conversion relation described by g(·) in Eq. (4), we can inversely obtain the
binary representation of weights B from its fixed-point counterpart as well.
3.3 Bit-Flip Attack
In this work, we perform the BFA utilizing the similar mechanism as FGSM [6], which
was used to generate adversarial example. The key idea of BFA is to flip the bits along
its gradient ascending direction w.r.t the loss of DNN. We take the binary vector b in
Eq. (4) as an example and attempt to perform BFA upon b. We first calculates the
gradients of b w.r.t loss as:
∇bL = [ ∂L
∂bNq−1
, ...,
∂L
∂b0
] (5)
2Note that, all the targets t in this work are not the ground-truth labels, but the outputs of the clean DNN
w.r.t the input data.
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where L is the inference loss of DNN parametrized by b. The naive operation is to
directly perform the bit-flip using the gradients obtained in Eq. (5) and get perturbed
bits as:
bˆ = b + sign(∇bL) (6)
where sign(∇bL) ∈ {−1,+1}Nq . However, since the bit value is constrained between
0 and 1 (b ∈ {0, 1}Nq ), flipping the bit as Eq. (6) could lead to data overflow. Ideally,
the BFA is supposed to follow the truth table in Table 1. Thus, we mathematically
redefine the BFA as follows:
m = b⊕ (sign(∇bL)/2 + 0.5) (7)
bˆ = b⊕m (8)
where ⊕ is the bit-wise xor operator. m is the mask which indicates whether to
perform the bit-flip operation.
Table 1: Truth table of Bit-Flip Attack (BFA). bi is the clean bit and bˆi is the perturbed
bit by BFA.m indicate whether there exist value change between bi and bˆi. The positive
and negative of ∂L/∂bi are represented by 1 and 0 respectively.
bi sign(∂L/∂bi) bˆi m
0 1 (+) 1 1
0 0 (-) 0 0
1 1 (+) 1 0
1 0 (-) 0 1
3.4 Progressive Bit Search
Rather than performing the BFA upon each bit throughout the entire network, our goal
is to perform BFA in a more precise and effective fashion. In this subsection, we
propose a method called Progressive Bit Search (PBS) which combines the gradient
ranking and progressive search. The proposed PBS method attempts to identify and
flip nb most vulnerable bits per BFA iteration (nb = 1 by default), thus progressively
degrading the performance of DNN until it reaches the minimum accuracy or the preset
number of iteration. As the flowchart of performing PBS depicted in Fig. 1, for each
attack iteration, the process of bit searching can be generally divided into two succes-
sive steps: 1) In-layer Search: the in-layer search is performed through electing the nb
most vulnerable bits in the selected layer, then record the inference loss if those elected
bits are flipped. 2) Cross-layer Search: with the in-layer search conducted upon each
layer of the network independently, the cross-layer search is to evaluate the recorded
loss increment caused by BFA with in-layer search, thus identify the top nb vulnerable
bits across different layers. The details of each step are described as follows.
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Figure 1: Flowchart to perform Progressive Bit Search (PBS) with in-layer and cross-
layer search.
In-layer Search. For the PBS in k-th iteration, in-layer searching of the nb most
vulnerable bits from Bˆ
k
l in l-th layer is performed through gradient ranking. With the
given vectored input x and target t, the inference and back-propagation are performed
successively to calculate the gradients of bits w.r.t the inference loss. Then, we de-
scendingly rank the vulnerability of bits by the absolute value of their gradients ∂L/∂b
and elect the bits whose gradients are top-nb, such process can be written as:
bˆk−1l = Top
nb
∣∣∣∣∇Bˆk−1l L(f(x; {Bˆk−1l }Ll=1), t)
∣∣∣∣ (9)
where {Topnb} function returns the pointer pointing at the storage of those elected nb
vulnerable bits. Then, we apply the BFA on those elected bits as:
bˆkl = bˆ
k−1
l ⊕m (10)
where the mask m is generated following Eq. (7). Now, with the in-layer search and
BFA performed on the l-th layer, we have to evaluate the loss increment caused by BFA
in Eq. (10), which can be written as:
Lkl = L
(
f(x; {Bˆkl }Ll=1), t
)
(11)
where the only difference between {Bˆkl }Ll=1 and {Bˆ
k−1
l }Ll=1 are the bits flipped in
Eq. (10). Note that, those bits flipped to bˆkl in Eq. (10) will be restored back to bˆ
k−1
l
after the loss evaluation is finished.
Cross-layer Search. As the aforementioned in-layer search can perform the layer-
wise vulnerable bits election and BFA evaluation, the cross-layer search evaluates the
BFA across the entire network. For the PBS in k-th iteration, the cross-layer search
first independently conduct the in-layer search on each layer, and generate the loss set
as {Lk1 ,Lk2 , · · ·,LkL}. Then, we could identify the layer-j with maximum loss and
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re-perform the BFA (without restore) on the bits elected in j-th layer, which can be
expressed as:
bˆkj = bˆ
k−1
j ⊕m
s.t. j = arg max
l
{Lkl }Ll=1 (12)
After that, PBS is entered into k + 1 iteration.
Table 2: BFA on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-20/32/44/56, under various quantization bit-
width (Nq=4/6/8). Nflip is the number of bit-flips required (5 trials) to degrade the
top-1 accuracy below 11% with BFA, regardless whether there exists bits flipped
back to their original states. For CIFAR-10, top-1 accuracy with random guess is
10%. DB is the hamming distance between clean- and perturbed- binary weight
(DB =
∑L
i=1D(Bˆl,Bl)). The bold number with underline highlight the mismatch
between two corresponding Nflip and DB, which indicates there exist even bit-flips on
the identical bit/bits.
Baseline
Acc.
Nq = 8 Nq = 6 Nq = 4
Acc. Nflip DB Acc. Nflip DB Acc. Nflip DB
Net20 92.11 92.28 [7,10,10,12,17] [7,10,10,12,17] 91.89 [8,8,11,12,13] [8,8,11,12,13] 91.85 [7,7,7,8,12] [7,7,7,8,12]
Net32 92.77 92.32 [8,9,12,13,31] [8,9,12,13,31] 93.09 [9,10,12,14,23] [9,10,12,14,23] 92.31 [10,12,14,14,17] [10,12,14,14,17]
Net44 93.10 93.60 [6,10,11,13,22] [6,10,11,13,22] 93.39 [13,13,15,16,17] [13,13,15,16,17] 91.52 [14,14,15,16,50] [14,14,15,16,50]
Net56 92.59 93.14 [16,17,18,22,22] [16,17,18,22,22] 93.56 [16,16,17,20,21] [16,16,17,20,21] 92.53 [9,21,21,23,24] [9,21,21,21,24]
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental setup
Datasets: We take two visual datasets: CIFAR-10 [30] and ImageNet [31] for object
classification task. CIFAR-10 contains 60K RGB images in size of 32× 32. Following
the standard practice, 50K examples are used for training and the remaining 10K for
testing. The images are drawn evenly from 10 classes. ImageNet dataset contains 1.2M
training images divided into 1000 distinct classes. The data augmentation used in this
work is identical to methods in [32]. Note that, the proposed BFA is performed through
randomly draw a sample of input images from the test/validation set, where the default
sample size is 128 and 256 for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet respectively. Then, only the
sample input is used to perform BFA, where the rest data and ground-truth labels are
isolated from the attacker. Moreover, each experimental configuration is run with 5
trials to alleviate error caused by the randomness of sampling input.
Network Architectures and quantization: For CIFAR-10, experiments are con-
ducted on series of residual network (ResNet-20/32/44/56)[32], where the weights are
quantized into 4/6/8 bit-width with retraining. For ImageNet, we choose a variety of
famous network structures, including AlexNet, ResNet-18/34/50. Based on our obser-
vation, with high bit-width quantizer (e.g., Nq=8), directly quantizing the pre-trained
full-precision DNN without retraining (i.e., fine-tuning) only shows negligible accu-
racy degradation. Therefore, for fast evaluation of our proposed BFA on ImageNet
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dataset and its various network structures, we directly perform the weight quantization
without retraining before conducting the BFA.
Attack Formulation: Traditional attack mostly focuses on attacking DNN by feed-
ing perturbed inputs [6] to the network. Such adversarial attack can be grouped into
two major categories: 1) white-box attack [6, 7], where the adversary has full access
to the network architecture and parameters, and 2) black-box attack [33, 34], where
the adversary can only access the input and output of a DNN without its internal con-
figurations. For our proposed BFA, it demands the full access to the DNN’s weights
and gradients. Thus BFA can be considered as a white box attack. However, we as-
sume that even under white box attack setup, the attacker has no access to the training
dataset, training algorithm and hyper parameters used during the training of network.
4.2 BFA on CIFAR-10
Our bit-flip attack is evaluated across different architectures (i.e., ResNet-20/32/44/56)
using varying quantized bit-widths (i.e., Nq=4/6/8) on CIFAR-10 dataset in Table 2.
Without BFA, the quantized models show negligible accuracy degradation or even
higher accuracy in comparison to their full-precision counterpart. The quantization
noise introduced by the weight quantization is considered as a regularization method,
which might contribute the accuracy improvement when model training is over-fitting.
Since CIFAR-10 dataset has 10 different classes of object, degrading the model’s
accuracy down to 10% is equivalent to make the model as random output generator.
In contrast to adversarial example (e.g., PGD attack [7]), our proposed BFA is un-
able to degrade the network accuracy to 0%. The reason is adversarial example is an
input-specific attack which is designed to misclassify each input separately, while our
proposed BFA attempts to misclassify the images from each object category using the
identical attacked model. Consequently, the successful BFA would be making the DNN
to generate output randomly. Therefore, we report the number of bit-flips Nflip required
to cause the DNN’s test accuracy to go below 11% as the measurable indicator of BFA
performance, for CIFAR-10 dataset.
As the experimental result listed in Table 2, for all the ResNet architecture with
varying quantization bit-width, the required number of bit-flips Nflip to make the DNN
malfunction is most likely below 20. Besides Nflip, we take the hamming distance DB
between clean- and perturbed-model as another measurable indicator. The intuition
behind is our proposed BFA attempts to flip the selected bits without considering its
original status. Thus, it exists the probability that some of the bits might be flipped
repeatedly with even times. However, the reality is that such back and forth bit-flips
rarely happen throughout all the experiments. Under varying quantization configura-
tions, there is no obvious relation between the quantization bit-width and the required
number of bit-flips (i.e., robustness of DNN against BFA).
4.3 BFA on ImageNet
The summary of evaluation of our attack on ImageNet dataset is presented in table 3.
We report both baseline and 8-bit quantized network accuracy for four popular image
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classification architectures on ImageNet. We observe roughly 0.1-0.4 % reduction in
Top-1 classification accuracy after quantizing the network’s weights to 8-bits. Since
ImageNet dataset has 1000 different classes of objects, a classification accuracy of
0.1% can be considered as random output. Thus reporting only the number of bit flips
Nflip required to cause the accuracy to degrade to below 0.2% would be sufficient to
prove the attack’s effectiveness.
Table 3: BFA on ImageNet with various network architecture, under direct 8-bit weight
quantization (without retraining). Accuracy (Acc.) is in top1/top5 format. Nflip is the
median number of bit-flips (out of 5 trials) required to degrade the top-1 accuracy
below 0.2%. For ImageNet, top-1 accuracy with random guess is 0.1%. DB is the cor-
responding hamming distance. Capacity is the number of bits used for weight storage
(# of weights × 8).
Model
(Capacity)
Baseline
Acc. %
Quantized
Acc. % Nflip DB
AlexNet [31]
(488,806,720) 56.55/79.08 56.13/78.94 17 17
ResNet-18 [32]
(93,516,096) 69.76/89.08 69.50/88.98 13 13
ResNet-34 [32]
(174,381,376) 73.30/91.42 73.13/91.38 11 11
ResNet-50 [32]
(204,456,256) 76.15/92.87 75.84/92.82 11 11
For ImageNet, BFA with PBS attack requires only 17 (median of 5 trials ) bit
flips out of 480 Million bits to crush AlexNet. However, Nflip decreases even more as
we perform the attack on ResNet architectures. Figure 3 shows accuracy degradation
for ResNet models, which has a much steeper slope than AlexNet. As AlexNet does
not have residual connections, which may result in different response to such gradient
based attacks. For ResNet networks, as the network parameters keep increasing, it re-
quires lesser number ofNflip to attack the network. Finally, Our attack makes a ResNet-
50 architecture dysfunctional by flipping 11 out of 200 Million bits only. The attack
achieves such success by modifying roughly 0.000003% of the bits to destroy the fully
functional DNN. Thus the gravity of DNN parameter’s security concern can be summa-
rized as two identical models with 50M similar weights but only a 0.000003% error in
the parameters can generate totally different output values causing a 63% degradation
in test accuracy.
4.4 Ablation study
PBS with various sample size. In our experiment, we randomly sample a set of input
images from the test/validation subset to perform the BFA, which we define it as attack
sample. Then, we evaluate the effectiveness of the attack on the whole test data set
which works as a validation. We opted to perform the validation on the whole test
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Figure 2: The BFA performance of ResNet-18 with various attack sample size
(16/32/64/128/256) on ImageNet dataset. Regions in shadow indicates the error band
w.r.t 5 trials.
dataset including the random batch that was originally selected for the attack because
the sample size is too small compared to the whole test dataset for both ImageNet and
CIFAR-10. In this section, we perform an ablation study on the attack sample size.
In figure 2, We configure the sample size from 16-256 and plotted Top-1 validation
accuracy, Top-5 validation accuracy, Sample loss and validation loss respectively.
The performance of the attack based on attack sample size can be ranked as: S(128) >
S(32) > S(256) > S(64) > S(16). Even though the effect of sample size does not
hinder the attack strength much but with a sample size of 128, our attack requires the
fewest bit flips to reach 10%. On the other hand, with a sample size of 16, the attack
strength slightly degrades. Our observation encourages not to select a too large or too
small attack sample size. One probable explanation would be if we compute the gradi-
ent with respect to large samples, then the attack might fail to properly maximize the
loss with respect to every sample. Again, if the sample size is too small then the sample
loss may not be representative of the whole test data set.
PBS versus random bit-flips. In this section, we perform an ablation study on ran-
domly flipping any bits of a random weight in the network. First, we test random bit
flip on a full-precision weight(i.e, floating point) on ResNet-18 model. For floating
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Figure 3: The accuracy (Top1/Top5) and loss evolution curve versus the number of
bit-flips (Nflip) under BFA, for AlexNet/ResNet-18/ResNet-50 on ImageNet dataset.
The sample size for performing BFA is 256. On each network architecture, we run 5
experiments and the region in shadow indicates the error-band. For all experiments in
this figure, there exists no bit flipped multiple times during the attack (i.e., Nflip = DB).
point weights represented in standard IEEE format, if we change the most significant
bits of the exponent section, then the floating-point weight value would change by huge
amount. As a result, the trained ResNet-18 Network starts malfunctioning even after
just one random bit flip.
Then, we implement the random bit flip on 8-bit Quantized ResNet-18 architecture
as shown in figure 4. It shows that by flipping even 100 random bits, the Top-1 accu-
racy on ImageNet dataset does not degrade more than 1%. It demonstrates the need
for an efficient bit search algorithm to identify the most vulnerable bits as randomly
flipping any bit does not hamper neural network too much. In comparison, our attack
algorithm requires just 13 bits out of 93M for ResNet-18 to totally cause the network
to malfunction on ImageNet dataset.
4.5 Comparison to other methods
Progressive bit search is the very first attack bit searching algorithm developed to mal-
function a quantized neural network through perturbation of stored model parameters
using row hammer attack. We already showed in previous section that the previous
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Figure 4: Randomly flipping bits of a ResNet-18 architecture on ImageNet. Even
after flipping 100 random bits the network’s both Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy does not
degrade significantly.
attack algorithms [12, 20] on floating-point model parameters are not efficient. They
do not consider that attacking floating point DNN model is as easy as flipping most
significant exponent bits of any random weights. Our developed BFA with PBS is the
first work that puts emphasis on the need for developing attack algorithms to prop-
erly scrutinize the security of DNN model parameters. Our attack can crush a DNN
model to demonstrate DNN’s vulnerability to intentional malicious bit flips. Further,
our algorithm would encourage more future work on both attack and defense front in
an attempt to make neural network more resilient and robust.
5 Discussion
Why only a few bit flips can cause such destructive phenomena? In the analysis of
the existence of adversary in deep neural network, Goodfellow et al. [6] concluded that
deep neural networks exhibit vulnerability to adversarial examples due to their extreme
linearity. The linearity of these models is the reason why they cannot resist adversary.
The theory suggests that, with sufficient large input dimension, a network will always
be vulnerable to noise injected at any layer. Our proposed BFA with PBS attack also
introduces noise at different layers of the DNN. Any noise injected at the intermediate
layer will increase as it is multiplied by the input features .
Table 4: Attacking a VGG16 [35] model’s only the first and last layer separately on
CIFAR-10 dataset. Attacking the first layer is much more effective. The noise injected
at the early stages of the network keeps growing as it propagates through the following
layers.
Layer to attack Nflip Accuracy (%)
First Conv. layer 20 10.06
Last linear layer 20 84.61
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For VGG16 network we observed similar phenomena where among the 15 bit flips
required to degrade the accuracy to 10 percent, 9 of them are in the first six layers.
Additionally, we confirm this hypothesis of noise propagation across layers by the
experiment shown in table 4. We attack the model by freezing all the layers (making
them not accessible to the attacker) except the first layer, then we do the opposite by
freezing all the layers except the last one. As expected, attacking the first layer achieves
higher attack success. However, this linearity theory may be too simple to explain other
complex phenomena inside a DNN and may not hold true across different architectures.
For example, ResNet architecture which has skip connections, tend to evenly distribute
the bit flips across different layers.
BFA with PBS does not suffer from gradient obfuscation. Generation of adversar-
ial examples in quantized network using straight-through estimator introduces gradient
obfuscation [36, 37]. Attacking a quantized network becomes tricky as such network
shows signs of gradient scattering [36]. In this work, we also used a quantized network
which implements a uniform quantizer. However, our network directly uses quan-
tized weights to do the inference after training. We calculate the gradient directly with
respect to the quantized weights to avoid gradient obfuscation. Moreover, the per-
formance of BFA against 4,6,8 bits quantized networks proves that the effectiveness
of BFA does not degrade due to the presence of a non-differentiable function at the
forward path.
Potential Defense Methods. In order to defend adversarial examples, most common
approach now-a-days is to train the network with a mixture of clean and adversarial ex-
amples [6, 7]. One of the proposed defense methods against BFA would be to train the
network to solve Madry’s Min-Max optimization problem [7]. Their approach called
adversarial training minimizes two losses: one from real image and other from adver-
sarial image. Hence, we perform adversarial training using BFA with PBS to minimize
two such losses: one computed from the original network and the other computed from
the same network with one bit flip for each batch.
However, unlike adversarial training, such a training method does not help in im-
proving the robustness of the network. Our attack can bypass adversarial training
scheme primarily because of a large search space of close to 93M bits. Even if we train
the network to be resilient to several bit-flips, there will always remain some bits that
will be vulnerable to attack. Another potential defense against BFA can be quantized
networks. Again our observation in table 2, does not show any co-relation between
number of quantization bits with the number of bit-flips required. Thus some of the
popular adversarial defense methods [7, 37] fail against our BFA attack. The above
observations make our attack even more threatening for deep learning applications.
6 Conclusion
Our proposed attack is the very first work for vulnerable bit search on quantized neural
networks. BFA puts light on why the security analysis for neural network parameters
needs more attention. We demonstrate through extensive experiments and analysis that
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the vulnerability of DNN parameter to malicious bit-flips is extremely severe than an-
ticipated. We would encourage further investigation on both attack and defense front
in order to thrive towards developing a more resilient network for deep learning appli-
cations.
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